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Abstract
In this article we discuss the efforts made by importers of fresh produce within
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1 Introduction
Past food scares have prompted the development of voluntary programmes on food
safety being promoted by public authorities and voluntarily implemented by food opera-
tors. Food operators (producers, handlers, retailers) have voluntarily adopted individual
or collective quality management systems to guarantee food quality and/or safety and
promote public health. For example, 10 years ago the British Egg Industry Council
introduced the Lion Quality Scheme which sets high standards of food safety and ani-
mal welfare and currently accounts for 85% of egg production in the United Kingdom.1
More recently, in 2007, the California Department of Food and Agriculture approved
the California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement which gathers to-
gether 71 handlers who represent more than 99 % of all California leafy green produc-
tion. Once in the agreement handlers commit to handling California products only from
growers who can show that they follow good agricultural practices and use a traceability
system (Calvin, 2007). In France, voluntary programmes have been developed in the
import industry of fresh produce. In 2001, in Perpignan2 (south of France) importers
negotiated with public authorities to introduce a voluntary safety programme to bet-
ter check the safety (the amounts of pesticide residues) of fresh produce that enter the
French market and thus the European Union.
In this article we investigate why rms adopt differentiated behaviour in voluntary
programmes on food safety by developing an analytical framework and making a theo-
retical prediction. We consider a risk averse importer who is uncertain about the safety
of fresh produce he markets and therefore decides to monitor some boxes to be sold.
To do so, he conducts laboratory analyses to check if there are pesticide residues on
produce. Indeed, food safety in the French fresh fruit and vegetables industry relies on
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for pesticides. The importer's safety effort increases
the probability that each box will pass successfully through all the steps in the supply
chain (wholesaler, retailer) to the consumer, without any safety failure. We show the-
oretically that the larger the rm the lower the safety effort. We test this theoretical
prediction using primary data collected in 2006 for importers of fresh produce who par-
1Source: http://www.britisheggindustrycouncil.com. Accessed 20 September 2010.
2In 2004, France imported 2.7 tons of fresh produce through 3 imports market. The Perpignan market
accounts for 50.8% of this volume, followed by the market Rungis (34.4%) and the market in Marseille
(14.8%). Source: www.saintcharlesinternational.fr. Accessed 20 September 2010.
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ticipate in the voluntary programme of the Perpignan import market. We thus estimate
the determinants of their safety effort according to several rm characteristics (size,
supplier, customer, etc.). Our empirical setting validates the negative link between rm
size and the level of safety effort.
As far as we know, the theoretical literature on quality management in supply chains
has not yet analysed the link between rm size and the level of monitoring. Indeed,
scholars mostly focused on the design of contracts and inspection policies of a single
product in the presence of moral hazard (see Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995a and 1995b
and Starbird, 2005). By contrast both theoretical and empirical studies in environmental
economics have established that rm size inuences rm environmental efforts. Most of
these studies analyse whether rm size (total sales or number of employees) explains the
rm's participation in a voluntary programme. They show that the larger rms are more
likely to participate in environmental voluntary programmes. However, interpretations
of this size effect vary across studies. Arora and Cason (1995) evaluate why polluting
rms participate in one of the most important voluntary programmes implemented in
the US by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPAs 33/50 program). They underline
that larger rms have the ability to inuence the design of standards and thus to preempt
regulatory threats. Scheffman (1992) suggests that this strategy allows rms to increase
the costs for smaller rivals to achieve competitive advantage in the market. Grolleau et
al. (2007) in a study of the agro-food industry looked at the incentives for French food
operators to improve their environmental efforts through a certication process. They
show that the larger the food operator the more likely he will make environmental ef-
forts to improve his on-site management. Some research argues that greater visibility to
consumers might explain voluntary environmental efforts. Videras and Alberini (2000)
analyse the types of rms that participate in three voluntary environmental programmes
(EPAs 33/50 program, Waste Wise Program, Green Lights Program). Regardless of the
programme, the authors show that larger rms are more likely to participate in these
schemes because they are more visible to consumers than small rms. King and Lenox
(2000) have obtained a similar result in their analysis of the participation of chemical
rms in the chemical industry's Responsible Care Program. Some research argues that
the presence of economies of scale in environmental effort explains the size effect (Das-
gupta et al. (2000), King and Lenox (2000)). DeCanio andWatkins (1998) establish that
the implementation of environmental efforts may imply xed costs that could explain
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the size effect.
The originality of our article is twofold. First, to our knowledge, our contribution
is one of the rst econometric analyses on the determinants of safety efforts from food
operators in a voluntary programme. Food safety is a sensitive topic, such that nding
adequate data is often very difcult. Our dataset is the only one to combine both data
on French importers characteristics (size, suppliers, customers) and on the number of
pesticide residue analyses. Second, this novelty in data and topic leads us to contrast
with the ndings of a positive inuence of size. Indeed, the case made in previous
studies is absent in our context. Importers don't have any reputation on the end market.
Also, they don't benet from economies of scale in monitoring the level of pesticides
residues on produce. Moreover, since we focus on a safety hazard which does not induce
cross-contamination, small rms are in a riskier situation than large rms and therefore
make greater safety effort.
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model, the benchmark sit-
uation (risk neutral importers) and sets out our main theoretical proposition (risk averse
importers). Section 3 describes the empirical context, the data and the econometric
analysis. Section 4 provides conclusions.
2 Analytical framework
We consider an importer who can sell n boxes of imported produce because of its ca-
pacity constraint (size of his warehouse).3 The boxes are packed by foreign suppliers
who send fresh produce to importers. A box contains one kind of fresh produce, for in-
stance citrus fruit, tomatoes, strawberries, etc. The safety of the produce is determined
by the activities of the grower (who may spray too much pesticides) and importers do
not have any information on the grower's production practices. Thus, a percentage of
the boxes the importer receives may contain levels of pesticide residues above the maxi-
mum levels dened by the law (unsafe boxes). The remaining boxes do not (safe boxes).
Therefore, for the importer the percentage of safe boxes (and then the percentage of un-
safe boxes) is exogenous. There isn't any cross-contamination between boxes, as the
type of food safety hazard we consider is pesticide residues (compared with microbi-
3We assume this constraint is binding. Empirically, this assumption is realistic because importers
operate "just-in-time transactions" and they always use their warehouses at their maximum capacity.
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ological contamination e.g. Salmonella). Therefore, the occurrence of a safety failure
(a given box of produce found to be unsafe) is independent4 across boxes. In order to
check the safety of the produce, the importer runs pesticide residue laboratory analyses
on a random sample of boxes. If the importer detects a box as unsafe, he will be able
to replace it at insignicant costs. Indeed, any importer can easily nd any quantity of
produce they need. There are always more boxes of produce available on the market
than the number needed by importers because some boxes of produce reach the market
without any addressee.
The importer, as a broker, receives a commission for each box he sells. However
the importer can sell unsafe boxes (he has not checked them or has not detected them
as unsafe). In such a case, there is a probability that a public authority, one of the
downstream operators or a consumer (thereafter a 'third party') detects a product defect.
In the fresh produce industry, full traceability is mandatory:5 when a third party detects
a box as unsafe the importer will receive no commission.
2.1 The model
For each of the boxes the importer receives, the scenario is the following (see Figure 1):
(1) the importer receives a box of produce. For this box, there is some exogenous
probability, 0 < α < 1, that it is safe. (2) The importer makes some effort, e  0, to
discover if the box is safe. The probability that an unsafe box is detected as unsafe by
the importer is d (e) and depends positively on the effort ewith d0 (e)> 0. In other words
the greater the effort the higher the chance to detect unsafe boxes. The technology is
such that it never incorrectly reports a safe box to be unsafe. However, an unsafe box
can be reported as safe.6 If the importer detects an unsafe box, either he returns the box
4A box corresponds to a given producer, a given plot of land (that is homogeneous soil and climate)
and a given day of harvest.
5Mandatory full traceability suggests that there might be some notion of reputation for importers
through the records of their failures by retailers. However, according to our qualitative survey among
importers and retailers, importers do not have any reputation with retailers and retailers do not record
importers' safety failures (which are not numerous). Further research would be necessary to understand
why there isn't any notion of safety reputation.
6The detection technology (at any step) is imperfect and even when checks reveal no default this does
not mean that the produce checked is safe.
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to the foreign sender or he destroys it.7 In this situation, the foreign sender supports
all the costs induced. That is the costs of handling the box, the costs of analyses and
the costs of return to sender or destruction. In such a case, the importer substitutes the
default box by a replacement (new) box.8 The scenario for this new box starts at point
(1). The box is safe with probability α and so on and so forth. The importer sells the
boxes he does not report as unsafe. (3) Those boxes being sold can be inspected by
a third party. We dene s ε (0;1) as the probability that an unsafe box is detected as
unsafe by a third party. The importer will receive a commission (G in Figure 1) for each
box sold without any detected safety failure. He will receive zero for each box sold and
detected as unsafe by a third party.9
Figure 1: Scenario for one box
7At this stage, our results will not be affected if we consider that the importer can choose whether to
send back or to destroy the box.
8At this stage, our results will not be affected if we assume that the importer can choose whether to
replace the box or not.
9Here we assume that once the importer has sold a box he is unable to say if the box has been analysed
or not: the recording system (of analysed products) is imperfect. It might be more costly for the importer
(search, organisational and transactions costs) to recoup the testing costs (300 EUR) once he has sold the
box than to assume them. If we had assumed that the recording system worked perfectly, once a third
party had detected an unsafe box, the importer would have been able to recoup the testing costs. Leaving
out the latter assumption doesn't change our result. Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
6
This scenario allows us to dene p the probability (for each box) that the importer
receives a commission normalised to 1. This probability is given by
p= (α+(1 α)(1 d (e))(1  s))
+∞
∑
j=0
[(1 α)d (e)] j (1)
In order to explain equation (1), let us build it step by step. We consider an importer
who has a capacity of one box. We calculate the probability for this importer to get a
commission G= 1 when he is not able to replace an unsafe box by a new one, when he
has the ability to replace the box once and when he has the ability to replace it twice.
First, we examine the case of an importer who has not the ability to replace the box if he
detects the box as unsafe. The importer will receive a commission only if the produce is
safe or if the produce is unsafe but not detected as unsafe by himself or by a third party
in the supply chain. In this situation the probability to get a commission is given by
p0 = α +(1 α)(1 d (e))(1  s). Second, consider an importer who has the ability
to replace once a box he detects as unsafe. The probability to get 1 becomes p1 =
p0+(1 α)d (e) p0, where (p0) refers to the probability that the box is sold without
any reported detection, while the term (1 α)d (e) p0 refers to the probability that the
box is detected as unsafe by the importer and has been replaced by a new box, that is
then sold without any reported detection. Third, imagine that the importer can replace
the box at most twice: he detects the rst box as unsafe and he replaces it by a new one.
The importer also reports this second box as unsafe and he changes it for a third one.
The third one is sold and has not been detected as unsafe by a third party. Therefore,
the probability becomes: p2 = p0+ (1 α)d (e) p0+ ((1 α)d (e))2 p0. To get the
probability p in equation (1), we keep on this reasoning up to the situation where the
importer will replace a box each time he detects it as unsafe.
The probability p is also the probability that a box sold by the importer passes
through all the steps of the supply chain. It can be rewritten as
p=
α+(1 α)(1 d (e))(1  s)
1  (1 α)d (e) ; (2)
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and this probability p increases with respect to e:
∂ p
∂e
=
αs(1 α)d0 (e)
(1  (1 α)d (e))2 > 0: (3)
The greater the safety effort the importer makes, the higher the chance for a box
to reach the consumer without any safety defect. As suggested in equation (2), p de-
pends on α which is inuenced by production practices from upstream suppliers and
on s which is inuenced by downstream operators. We assume that p also depends
on additional parameters which we will specify in the empirical part (the adoption of
a quality management system, etc.). We then dene X as a vector which includes α ,
s and these additional parameters. We assume that those parameters do not affect the
marginal effect of effort and then ∂ p∂e > 0 still holds. Formally,
p p(e;X) (4)
In our empirical analysis, the cost per laboratory analysis is constant, therefore in
our setting the cost of running n e pesticide residue analyses is linear, with marginal
cost being c> 0. In addition, the cost of handling n boxes isC (n). As we have already
mentioned, the importer only assumes the costs for the boxes he is going to sell.
We can now dene the expected utility of an importer who has a capacity of n boxes.
Let k be a random variable for the number of boxes the importer has sold and which
pass through all the steps in the supply chain without any detected safety failure, i.e.
k represents the total commission. In other words, k is the number of successes in a
random experiment (repeated n times) with a binomial probability of success p. The
probability that k boxes among n pass successfully through all the steps in the supply
chain without any detected default is given by
 n
k

(p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k where n
k

= n!k!(n k)! .
Let u denote the importer's utility function (as a function of his total commission),
with u(0) = 0, u0 > 0 and u00  0. The importer's objective is to maximise his expected
utility with respect to his effort e:
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max
e
Eu(n;e;X) =
n
∑
k=0

n
k

(p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k u(k)

(5)
 cne C (n) :
To illustrate equation (5), let us calculate the utility of an importer who has a ca-
pacity of 2 boxes. With a probability (1  p(e;X))2 ; the two boxes are detected by
the third party as unsafe and the importer obtains a utility of u(0) = 0. With proba-
bility 2p(e;X)(1  p(e;X)), the third party reports either the rst box as unsafe and
the second box as safe, or he reports the rst box as safe and the second one as un-
safe. In this situation, the importer obtains a utility u(1) for the box which passes
through the supply chain. With probability (p(e;X))2 none of the two boxes are re-
ported as unsafe by the third party and the importer obtains u(2). Therefore, the ex-
pected utility of the importer who has sold 2 boxes can be written: Eu(2;e;X) =
2p(e;X)(1  p(e;X))u(1) + (p(e;X))2 u(2)  2ce C (2). Equation (5) is the gen-
eralisation of this formula for an importer who has a capacity of n boxes.
2.2 Importers and safety efforts
First we develop the case of a risk neutral importer in order to provide a benchmark
to sustain the risk averse case. Let the importer's utility function u, be linear, u(k) =
γk+ µ , with γ > 0. e (n;X) denotes the optimal effort of the importer, n and X being
given. Therefore, the following result holds:
Proposition 1 When the importer is risk neutral, the optimal effort e does not depend
on the number of boxes he sells, e (n+1;X) = e (n;X).
(The proof is reported in Appendix 1.) For a risk neutral importer the benets and costs
increase proportionally relative to the number of boxes he sells, n.
Next, we analyse the situation when the importer is risk averse focusing on Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility functions, i.e. u is such that,
u(k) = δ exp( ak)+β ; (6)
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where δ > 0 and a =  u00u0 > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of
the importer. In this situation, we assume that for all n there exists an interior optimal
effort e (n;X). Therefore, the following result holds:
Proposition 2 When the importer is risk averse (a> 0), e (n+1;X)< e (n;X). Namely,
the higher the number of boxes, the lower the safety effort.
(The proof is reported in Appendix 1.) Proposition 2 suggests that an increase in the
number of boxes increases diversication of the risk. In other words, an importer who
sells a small number of boxes is in a more risky situation than an importer who sells a
higher number of boxes. If the importer is risk averse, then, the higher the level of risk
diversication, the lower the safety effort.
Let us illustrate this insurance effect with a simple example that involves two im-
porters. Importer A has a capacity of one box. He faces the following situation: either
his box passes all the steps in the supply chain with a probability p and he receives a
commission of 1, or, with a probability (1  p) the box is detected by a third party as
being unsafe and no commission is forthcoming. Importer B has a capacity of two boxes
of produce. He faces three potential situations: i) the two boxes pass all the steps in the
supply chain and he receives a commission of 2; ii) the two boxes are detected as being
unsafe and there is no commission; iii) only one of the two boxes is safe, which means
he will receive a commission of 1. It is the potential for the third situation to occur
that provides an insurance effect. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2. It represents the
expected utility as a function of the importer's effort when the number of boxes varies
between 1 and 10.
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Figure 2: Expected utility, effort and size.
Effort
Eu n=10
n=1
Specication: p(e;X) =
p
e
0:5+
p
e , α = 0:5, β = 5, a= 0:5, c= 0:5, andC (n) = 0
Complementary comparative statics: Let X = (xi)i=1;:::;t . The effect of a marginal
change in the characteristics xi on the optimal effort e (n;X) is,
∂e
∂xi
=
∂ 2Eu
∂e∂xi
 ∂ 2Eu∂e2
: (7)
Therefore, for CARA utility functions with a> 0, we obtain:
∂e
∂xi
∝
∂ 2p
∂e∂xi
  (n 1)(1  exp( a))
1  (1  exp( a)) p
∂ p
∂e
∂ p
∂xi
: (8)
We illustrate this with an example that we develope in the empirical section. Con-
sider the importer's propensity to work with supermarkets ((SupM), in the empirical
part). Supermarkets are most of the time assumed to have strict safety standards and
thus are more likely to detect unsafe products (Fulponi, 2006). According to this fact,
we can assume that the propensity to work with supermarkets increases s. According to
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equation (8), the effect of an increase in s on the optimal effort is
∂e
∂ s
∝
α (1 α)d0 (e)
(1  (1 α)d (e))2 (9)
+
(n 1)(1  exp( a))
1  (1  exp( a)) p
αs(1 α)2 d0 (e)(1 d (e))
(1  (1 α)d (e))3 ;
Therefore, ∂e

∂ s > 0. To protect himself against the risk that supermarkets detect unsafe
boxes, the importer would provide a greater level of safety effort. In other words, the
importer's propensity to work with supermarkets increases his level of safety effort.
We have just dealt with the behaviour of a risk averse importer who monitors boxes
of produce in an industry where cross-contaminations are highly unlikely and monitor-
ing costs are linear. In the empirical section, we test our second theoretical prediction
with primary data on the monitoring behaviour of French importers of fresh produce
because this context ts with the previously mentioned assumptions. Indeed, it was im-
possible to nd a good proxy for risk aversion and we were then not able to segment
the sample into risk-neutral and risk-averse importers and then to compare the results
predicted by the two propositions within a sample consisting of both kinds of importers.
An implicit assumption behind our empirical model is that all importers are risk averse.
3 Evidence from the French fresh produce imports in-
dustry
3.1 Context
3.1.1 French safety regulation related to pesticide residues
The denition of food safety for fresh fruit and vegetables in France relies on the MRLs
set by the European authorities (Regulation (EC) No 396/2005) or French law (Decree
04/08/1992, as amended). Residues found in or on produce are judged, according to
these laws, as being above, at or below the limit. Safety of fresh fruit and vegetables
in France and in Europe is one-dimensional, as opposed to the United States where
regulation on the safety of those produce also refers to the presence of microbiological
hazards such as Salmonella, etc.
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All French food operator (producers and importers) must comply with a 'perfor-
mance standard', as dened in Henson and Caswell (1999): the food product they mar-
ket should reach the prescribed product quality standards and/or safety levels. How they
do reach the standard is left to the discretion of the food operators. In French law, im-
porters are considered as producers, because they are the very rst to introduce foreign
produce into the national market.10 Importers of fresh produce are thus liable under
criminal law if produce do not comply with the regulations in force.
The DGCCRF (General Service for Consumption, Competition and the Repression
of Fraud), the public agency in charge of enforcing law and monitoring food safety,
mostly conducts regular on-site and product-oriented inspections. In the case of fresh
produce, samples are collected and laboratory analyses are carried out to check that
residue levels are within the legal limits. In an ofcial inspection, inspectors randomly
select a box of fruit or vegetables, take one or two pieces of the produce as a sample of
the box and send them to the ofcial laboratory which conducts multi-residue analyses.
If excess levels are found, importers are found guilty of an offence. Sanctions range
from a warning letter to prosecution and nes. Warning letter and nes are the most
common sanctions used by the public agency while prosecutions are quite rare. In the
same time, the whole box of the incriminated produce is taken off the market.
3.1.2 Laboratory analyses
The producer is the only person in control of pesticide use during the production and
post-harvest periods and, thus, the only person who is able to reduce the risk of excess
pesticide residues in or on produce. The remaining downstream operators can adopt two
courses of action: i) they can impose codes of good agricultural practices, like Global
GAP systems, on producers; ii) they can conduct laboratory analyses to check the safety
of produce they enter on the market.
In 2001, European Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 was issued, and imposed greater
responsibility on food operators for monitoring and provision of food safety. In response
to this requirement which came into force in 2007, French importers of fresh produce
started to order laboratory analyses to check the safety of their produce (Codron et al.,
2007). However, the French regulation remains in force and importers continue to have
10Art. L 221-1 ; Art. L 212 -1, French Consumption Law.
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to abide by the performance standard whatever other efforts they have introduced to
monitor safety.
3.1.3 The voluntary safety programme of Perpignan
Our empirical analysis focuses on the voluntary programme that French importers de-
veloped and initiated in 2001 in order to better comply with the new European food
safety regulation. Before 2001, few French importers ordered laboratory analyses to
detect levels of pesticide residues.11
The most important motivation of the negotiation was to achieve a specication
rather than a performance standard. For the importers participating in the programme,
there is a gap between the letter of the law and its enforcement. In the event of a
safety failure an importer that subscribes to the programme will be considered by public
authorities as having acted in good faith, and a negligence based rule will apply. This
is the main commitment of the public authorities in recognising the programme: the
programme allows participants to be found liable (under a strict liability rule) if and
only if they have failed to take due care (no analysis). Membership in the programme
provides rms with other advantages. The frequency of public controls is reduced.12
Also, customs clearance at the border is quicker (for produce from Morocco), since
inspection by French customs is waived.
There are 98 rms operating on the Perpignan imports market, 66 of whom were
members of the programme in 2006; 61.5% of the 66 members joined the programme
the rst year.
The goal of this voluntary programme is to achieve better levels of safety of fresh
produce entering the French market. As a condition of joining the voluntary programme,
importers must carry out individual laboratory analyses and must assign an employee
to manage quality control. The voluntary safety procedure is based on the principles of
the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point method (HACCP). Importers must set out a
sampling plan for fresh produce at the beginning of every year, based on the volumes
and types of produce being imported. In terms of the type of produce, importers must
identify fruit and vegetables that are more likely to show excess pesticide residues (e.g.,
11According to the qualitative survey conducted in 2004 by one of the authors prior to data collection.
12According to the same qualitative survey with public authorities conducted in summer 2004.
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strawberries). The risk of pesticide residue levels being exceeded varies widely accord-
ing to the produce and country of origin - in our case, mostly Spain and Morocco. In
terms of produce, importers do not usually specialise in the sale of only one or two prod-
ucts: for more than eight out of ten rms less than half of their total sales is represented
by one product type and they target all their produce for analyses.
The programme requires one analysis for 1 million EUR of sales. In other words, the
'theoretical' effort in the programme should be identical for all importers whatever their
size and would equal 1. We will see below this is not the case for some surveyed rms.
The importers board gathers information on the number of analyses conducted by the
rms participating in the programme. However, this is not made publicly available and
remains a sensitive topic. Thus, retailers, wholesalers, public authorities and consumers
have no information on (one importer) individual safety effort.
There are costs involved in joining the programme: rms have to pay an annual sub-
scription fee of 1,000 EUR and they also have to allocate human and nancial resources
to monitoring. Pesticide residues analyses are costly: 300 EUR for one multiresidue
analysis of pesticides. The marginal cost of the analysis is thus constant and importers
carry out at most one analysis per box of produce.
In the event of a safety defect, importers will have to report the results to the public
authorities, and the whole box of the incriminated produce will be removed from the
market. Only results that exceed the legal MRLs need to be reported.
3.2 Survey & Data
We conducted our survey during the summer 2006 covering the whole sample of rms
(66 members) participating in the Perpignan voluntary safety programme. We also col-
lected data from 12 rms that did not subscribe to the programme, none of which con-
duct any laboratory analysis. These rms represent 40% of the rms that are not part
of the programme, and 12% of the whole sample of rms operating in the Perpignan
market. The remaining 20 rms declined to answer our questionnaire. Firms that do not
belong to the voluntary programme cannot reduce their risk of being ned even if they
do conduct laboratory analyses. Only participants in the voluntary scheme benet from
the due care clause.
Interviewees, owners and employees, were asked questions, face-to-face, about the
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rm situation in 2005, and particularly about characteristics such as total amount of
sales, main produce, specialisation, resources allocated to safety controls, and also about
their operating environment (procurement and suppliers, customers).13 Our question-
naire also included some questions about the rm's perception of the pressure exerted
by public authorities and their main customer with respect to safety issues.
For our empirical framework, we are interested in what determines differentiated
behaviour within the voluntary programme. Therefore our underlying population is the
exhaustive sample of rms that participate in the safety programme (see table 1 for
descriptive statistics).14
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (62 observations)
Variables Acronym Units of measures Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Safety Effort Safetyeffort analyses/million EUR 2.73 5.38 0.25 42.85
Number of analysis in 2005 Nbrepest05 number of analyses 28.9 30.68 5 150
Sales in 2005 Sales million EUR 17.43 16.67 1.4 69
Sales in log form Salesln million EUR 2.47 0.89 0.33 4.23
Specialisation in one product Specialisation % of sales 0.36 0.184 6 80
Direct Supply for the main product DirectSupp dummy 0.37 0.48 0 1
Number of Suppliers NbSuppliers number of suppliers 42.25 35.53 1 141
Supermarket as the Main customer SupM dummy 0.40 0.49 0 1
Other Quality Management System implemented QMS dummy 0.21 0.41 0 1
Laboratory Analysis before the programme PrevLabAna dummy 0.53 0.50 0 1
Number of public monitoring in 2004 NbPuMo inspections/million EUR 0.41 0.469 0.018 2.38
Evaluation of Pressure exerted by public authorities PuPress dummy 0.74 0.44 0 1
Evaluation of Pressure exerted by customers CuPress dummy 0.69 0.46 0 1
We approximate the number of boxes by the total amount of sales (in million EUR)
in 2005  variable (Sales). Firm sales (size) range from 1.4 million EUR up to 69
million EUR with a mean at 17.43 million EUR and a standard deviation of about 100%
of the average. The bottom of the distribution includes a high number of small rms
and the median is less than 10 million EUR.
13The survey is available upon request.
14Descriptive statistics are for the observations in the estimation (62/66 rms) because of missing
values.
16
The absolute number of laboratory analyses carried out by importers in 2005 (Nbrepest05)
is 28.9 on average, ranging from 5 to 150. Firms are concentrated at the lower end of the
distribution with 75% of rms reporting less than 30 analyses. There is also wide diver-
sity in importers' behaviour (in doing analyses): the standard deviation of this variable
is 106.1%. The importer's safety effort (Sa f etye f f ort) relative to rm size, namely
the ratio (Nbrepest05=Sales) varies widely, from 0.25 to 42.85 (number of analyses per
million EUR). We observe that 15 out of 66 members don't comply with the rule of
one analysis per 1 million EUR of sales. Nonetheless, we know that those rms are
still in the programme today. This observation might reveal that the rule is not strictly
enforced. However, we would need more data to conclude that this behavior persists
over time. The effort made by importers widely differs from one to each other: the
average behaviour is 2.73 analyses per million EUR, the median being 2 and 90% of
rms reporting less than 3.8 analyses per million EUR. Because of this fact, we decide
to establish the real nature of the link between rm effort and size and to highlight the
determinants of this safety effort.
3.3 Econometric Analysis
In this section, we study the determinants of the rms' safety effort for importers who
participate in the voluntary programme.15 We test the following model:
ln(Sa f etye f f orti) = θ 0+W 0i θ 1+ ε i (10)
As endogenous variable, we consider the logarithm of the safety effort (ln(Sa f etye f f ort))
because we suspect the relation between rm safety effort and rm size might not be
linear.
As exogenous determinants, we select a set of variables, W 0i , to describe rm het-
erogeneity. Firm size is approximated by the logarithm of 2005 rm total amount of
sales expressed in million euro (Sales(ln)). Specialisation represents the proportion of
15Our analysis might suffer from a selection bias since we only use data for participating rms. We test
for selection bias using the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979). We add an explicit selection
equation to the primary equation of interest with the whole vector Wi and one variable: SalesCustFce,
which is the level of dependence of the rm, approximated by the proportion of sales the rm realised
in 2005 with its main customer. Since the Inverse Mills Ratio is not signicant, the use of OLS is not
invalidated.
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sales realised by importers from sales of their main product, i.e. the produce that rep-
resents the highest proportion in the rm's total sales. We characterise the importer's
upstream relationships with: i) DirectSupp that stands for the type of the main supplier.
DirectSupp is 1 when fresh produce comes directly from producers rather than through
an intermediary between producer and importer (cooperatives, exporters and other types
of suppliers). ii) NbSuppliers is the number of upstream suppliers (direct or indirect) the
importer normally deals with: the larger this number, the more difcult to monitor safety
because of supplier dispersion. NbSuppliers is the only quantitative variable which is
not on a 'per sales' basis. We think that the absolute number of suppliers provides a
more accurate picture with respect to diversity of the importers' suppliers. We charac-
terise downstream relationships by the main type of French customer. SupM is 0 if the
customer is a wholesaler, and 1 if it is a supermarket. Finally, we approximate for how
the rm has implemented the procedures to ensure delivery of safe fruit and vegetables.
QMS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the rm has adopted an additional
Quality Management System to the voluntary programme, i.e. ISO 9001/9002 certica-
tion, or HACCP certication, etc. If the voluntary safety programme is the only QMS
in place, then QMS is 0. PrevLabAna is 1 if the rm conducted laboratory analyses on
fresh produce before the implementation of the voluntary programme, otherwise it is 0.
We also consider the number of public inspections per unit of sales imposed on the rm
in 2005 (NbPuMo). As regards the rm's perception of public pressure, interviewees
were asked: 'As regards safety, would you consider that the pressure exerted on your
business by public authorities is very high, high, low or very low?'. We aggregated the
categories because the answers were concentrated in the two values in the middle (high
and low) making the two extremes (very high and very low) not workable due to the
very small number of observations. The aggregate dummy variable (PuPress) is 1 if
the importer felt that the pressure was important (very high or high), and 0 if the im-
porter felt that it was not important (low or very low). Similarly, we created a dummy
variable (CuPress) to measure the rm's perception of the pressure exerted by the main
customer. (PuPress) and (CuPress) are both subjective variables.16
16Note that these variables have low correlation with the others. To keep the richest model we ran a
likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the subjective variables : LR(χ2(2)) = 8:42,
p:value= 0:0149.
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3.4 Results
Table 2 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression and the results of
diagnostic tests.
Table 2: OLS estimates (Dependent variable: Safetyeffort)
Coefcients t-ratios
Sales(ln)  0:620  5:57
Specialisation  0:910  2:07
Directsupply 0:431 2:77
NbSuppliers 0:003 1:77
SupM 0:415 2:54
QMS  0:413  2:10
PrevLabAna 0:461 2:87
NbPuMo  0:29 1:38
PuPress  0:480  2:66
CuPress 0:001 0:01
Observations 62
Adjusted R-squared 0:56
Test for heteroskedasticity(a)
χ2(1) = 0:52
p:value= 0:4717
F-Statistic (10, 51) 8:89
LR (10) 62:582
Note: *; **, *** denote 10, 5 and 1 % signicance respectively.
(a): Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test.
Some of the variables for rm characteristics are signicant. As our second theo-
retical proposition predicts, rm size (i.e. Sales(ln)) has a negative effect on the safety
effort exerted by the rm. Firm's size reduces safety effort, which differs from previous
ndings in the literature and conventional wisdom.
Specialisation tends to reduce safety efforts. The few highly specialised rms op-
erate in very specic sectors (baby carrots, frozen broccoli). They secure their market
share (niche market) by ensuring quality. For these products, the value of the whole sup-
ply chain depends on quality management. In those supply chains, all suppliers must
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make efforts to ensure food safety (at all stages in the chain). The importer is the one
of nal links and his effort in terms of monitoring is marginal relative to the ones of
producers.
We nd that reliance on a direct procurement system (DirectSupp) has a signicant
and positive inuence on the number of pesticide analyses. However, we expected that
this should decrease the need for downstream safety controls. The way we built the
variable implies that the rm has a direct or indirect commitment in the production
process. By investing upstream, the importer devotes resources to the produce he is
selling in the French market. Even if the supplier is well-known to the rm, the importer
may also make greater levels of effort in order to protect his investment. The quantitative
variable NbSuppliers has a positive effect17 on the level of safety effort. This result
suggests that importers will be more likely to make a greater level of effort if their
procurement is atomised.
In terms of downstream operators, the type of the main customer (SupM) is sig-
nicant. The propensity for rms to work with supermarkets indirectly increases their
safety efforts. In our specic case, working with supermarkets and safety efforts are
complementary in marketing safe produce, although some studies show that French su-
permarkets are not explicitly asking for safety (Fulponi, 2006; Garcia Martinez and
Poole, 2004).
The fact that rms have implemented another Quality Management System (QMS)
has a negative effect on safety effort. Other quality management systems implemented
by rms tend to be more stringent than the requirements of the voluntary safety pro-
gramme. Laboratory analyses would appear to be a marginal tool within a broader ini-
tiative designed to ensure quality and safety. Therefore, quality management systems,
which are long-term investments, may act as substitutes for regular checking for pesti-
cide residues, which is a short-term investment. The fact that rms ordered laboratory
analyses (PrevLabAna) before implementation of the voluntary programme gives some
idea of their awareness of safety issues in their industry. The programme allows them
to maintain their level of awareness and even to increase it relatively to importers that
previously did not implement any laboratory analyses. Finally, the number of public
inspections of the rm per unit of sales (NbPuMo) has no inuence on the safety effort
exerted by importers in 2005.
17at the 10% condence level.
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We suspected the endogeneity of (PuPress): we expect that the fear of being in-
spected and, if detected, sanctioned by public authorities, approximated by (PuPress),
is endogenous to the decision about the level of effort made by the rm. The greater the
level of safety effort that the rm makes, the less likely it will perceive pressure from
the public authorities. We use the instrumental variables (IV) method (two stage least
squares) to deal with the endogenous explanatory variables. There are no restrictions on
the distribution of the exogenous and endogenous variables. One or both can be binary
variables (Wooldridge, 2002: 85). We ran the two stage least squares and the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. Since the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null, IV are
not warranted, while differences between the IV and OLS estimates are random.
The pressure exerted by public authorities regarding food safety (PuPress) has a
rather surprising negative impact on safety effort. This result is counter-intuitive: al-
though rms claim that pressure from the public authorities is high, their behaviour
concerning safety does not reect this. However, the perceived pressure from customers
(CuPress) does not inuence the rm's safety effort, although the type of main customer
(SupM) does.
4 Conclusions
The recent evolution of European food safety regulations is characterised by the in-
creased involvement and responsibility of food operators in food safety controls. The
2001 European Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 that came into in force in 2007 had this
objective. At that time, in the French import industry of fresh produce this evolution led
importers to implement and participate in a voluntary programme to check the safety of
imported produce. The main feature of the programme is that it translates performance
standards into specication standards. In the event of a safety failure being detected,
participants are held liable if and only if they have failed to implement safety efforts
(laboratory analyses). In other words, the programme relieves importers of their liabil-
ity in the event of a safety failure.
Our analysis focused on the reasons why French importers adopt differentiated be-
haviour in terms of food safety efforts within this voluntary programme. We have
showed theoretically that the larger the rm, the lower the number of analyses rela-
tively to its size. We validate this prediction using original primary data (referring to
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the year 2005) drawn from the exhaustive sample of importers who participate in the
voluntary programme on food safety implemented on the Perpignan market. We also
have established that the propensity for a rm to work with supermarkets and the safety
effort are positively correlated.
Our empirical results suggest that public authorities could work to ensure food safety
through two means. First, public authorities could directly affect rms' behaviour by
taking account of their intrinsic characteristics. Second, they could indirectly inuence
rms' safety efforts. They could exert pressure on downstream operators who would
transfer this pressure to their suppliers. Hovewer, more research is needed to know
whether our results can be generalised to other food industries.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The expected utility of an importer who sells n boxes can be written as:
Eu(n;e;X) = γ
n
∑
k=0

n
k

(p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k k

+µ
n
∑
k=0

n
k

(p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k

(A.1)
 cne C (n)
= n(γ p(e;X)  ce)+µ C (n) :
Hence, the expected utility of an importer who sells n+1 boxes is,
Eu(n+1;e;X) =
n+1
n
[Eu(n;e;X) µ+C (n)]+µ C (n+1) : (A.2)
Thus, the expected utility of an importer who sells n+ 1 boxes is an increasing linear
function of the expected utility of an importer who sells n boxes. We conclude that the
optimal probability p is the same for n or n+1 boxes.
Proof of Proposition 2
The expected utility of an importer who sells n boxes can be rewritten as:
Eu(n;e;X) = δ
 
n
∑
k=0

n
k

(exp( a) p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k
!
+β
 
n
∑
k=0

n
k

(p(e;X))k (1  p(e;X))n k
!
  cne C (n) ;
Or,
Eu(n;e;X) = δ (1  (1  exp( a)) p(e;X))n+β   cne C (n) ; (A.3)
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For an interior maximum, e (n;X), we must have,
δ (1  exp( a))(1  (1  exp( a)) p(e (n;X) ;X))n 1 ∂ p
∂e
(e (n;X) ;X) = c (A.4)
Moreover, the derivative of Eu(n+1;e;X) with respect to e is,
∂Eu
∂e
(n+1;e;X) =
(n+1)

δ (1  exp( a))(1  (1  exp( a)) p(e;X))n ∂ p
∂e
(e;X)  c

: (A.5)
Hence, at the point e (n;X), this derivative is,
∂Eu
∂e
(n+1;e (n;X) ;X) = (n+1)(1  exp( a)) p(e (n;X) ;X)c< 0: (A.6)
When the second order condition holds, the expected utility will be concave in e, and
we can conclude that e (n+1;X)< e (n;X).
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